

CONTROLS

Q. The charge is often made that the CIA has so much power and money that it carries on its own foreign policies without regard to other U. S. interests and beyond the control of the State Department. Is this true or false?

A. The charge is false. The CIA operates within U. S. policy guidance and is thoroughly responsive to a number of various types of controls and checks and balances.

Q. What form of controls are placed upon the Agency?

A. First and foremost, the CIA is part of the Executive Department. It is subordinate to the President and the National Security Council. Members of the National Security Council include the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.

A special committee of the NSC, with representatives from the State and Defense Departments, the White House staff and the CIA are charged with considering proposals for CIA clandestine operations before such operations are approved.

Overseas, our representatives are subordinate to the Ambassadors, who are the chiefs of American diplomatic missions. The CIA operates with the foreknowledge and approval of the Ambassadors.

In Washington, there is the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, first established under President Eisenhower in 1956. Currently this Board, chaired by Mr. Clark Clifford, includes such other eminent Americans as Dr. William O. Baker, Mr. Gordon Gray, Dr. William Langer, Mr. Robert Murphy, Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., Dr. Edwin Land, General Maxwell Taylor, Admiral John Sides, and Mr. Augustus Long.

The Board meets several times annually with the Director of Central Intelligence and heads of other intelligence agencies and looks into the accomplishments or shortcomings of the entire U. S. intelligence effort. The Board reports its findings and recommendations to the President. The Board is a very constructive force.

In addition, the CIA budget is reviewed fully by the Bureau of the Budget, which requires the same assurances and justifications for expenditures of intelligence agencies that it requires from any other part of our government. The CIA is not immune from detailed examination of our requests by the Bureau, nor are we exempt from its skillful pruning knife.

As to Congress, ever since the CIA was established, the Director has been authorized and directed to keep special subcommittees of the House and Senate fully informed of CIA activities and CIA assessments of international situations. In the House, the Appropriations Committee and Armed Services Committee each have a special subcommittee for this purpose. There are corresponding subcommittees in the Senate. CIA is completely responsive to questions from these subcommittees, no matter how sensitive. Meetings are frequent. In my first 12 weeks as Director I met 17 times with these Congressional groups. For 1965, the Director or senior officers met 34 times with the four subcommittees.

Q. In your view, are these controls effective? Can we be assured that CIA's actions are in keeping with U.S. foreign policy objectives as agreed by the State Department and the National Security Council?

A. Yes. I believe the controls are effective. And they reflect the typical American political tradition of prudent checks and balances. The CIA is, like other agencies of government, an instrument of service and dedicated to pursuing national objectives in support of agreed policy.

Q. Senator Fulbright and Senator McCarthy have said that CIA makes foreign policy and, therefore, that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should participate in control of the Agency.

A. CIA's main job is to produce finished national intelligence for the President and other policymakers on any activities or events abroad which may affect the national security. This is, therefore, one of the bases on which policy is made, but the Agency does not itself make or recommend policy. I am not going to talk about or respond to questions about classified activities of the Agency except that it does nothing except in response to policy guidance from outside the Agency.

Q. Are you in agreement with Senator Russell that his Senate Armed Services Committee, "by rules and practices of the Senate" has the principal Congressional authority over the CIA?

A. This is a matter for the Senate or the Congress to decide. A Congressman is in far better position than I to decide on how to organize to do a job.

Q. Do you agree with Vice President Humphrey who in a HEARST panel discussion said he favored in the Legislative Branch a counterpart to the National Security Council . . . "where you put the whole oversight of national security into one, orderly joint committee where the Congress can discuss the whole range of foreign and national security policy. All matters, including Central Intelligence operations could be freely discussed. "

A. If the President and the Congress direct the establishment of such an arrangement, the CIA would of course comply and participate.

It is my personal view, however, that any administration might find some practical political difficulties in this. There would be opportunities for those opposed to the Administration to learn secrets of the Executive Branch and to give a President the hot foot from time to time. This is a serious matter. After all, the President, by terms of the Constitution, is solely responsible for the conduct of our government's foreign affairs.

Q. Is there reason to fear for security of some Congressional bodies, say the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, as Senator Russell has indicated?

A. Inadvertent disclosures of classified information have a way of damaging our foreign policy interests. I do not personally know that any members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee are to be feared as "security risks."